We argue that subjective emotional experience, the feeling, is the essence of an emotion, and that objective manifestations in behavior and in body or brain physiology are, at best, indirect indicators of these inner experiences. As a result, the most direct way to assess conscious emotional feelings is through verbal self-report. This creates a methodological barrier to studies of conscious feelings in animals. While the behavioral and physiological responses are not 'emotions,' they contribute to emotions indirectly, and sometimes profoundly. Whether non-verbal animals have emotional experiences is a difficult, maybe impossible, question to answer in the positive or negative. But because behavioral and physiological responses are important contributors to emotions, and the circuits underlying these are highly conserved, studies of animals have an important role in understanding how emotions are expressed and regulated in the brain. Conflation of circuits that directly give rise to conscious emotional feelings with circuits that indirectly influences these conscious feelings has hampered progress in efforts to understand emotions, and also to understand and to develop treatments for emotional disorders. Recognition of differences in these circuits will allow research in animals to have a lasting impact on understanding of human emotions as research goes forward.
This review comes from a themed issue on Emotion-cognition interactions
Edited by Mara Mather and Michael Fanselow The English word 'emotion' is based on the Latin emovere, which means "to move away from." When first applied to psychological events in the 17th century, it pointed to an excited state of mind that causes movement (behavior). This is still the most common meaning of emotion in everyday vernacular speech. But in scientific discussions, the noun 'emotion,' or its adjectival form 'emotional,' are variably used to refer to subjective experiences, behavioral movements, physiological responses, and/or cognitions that contribute to any of the above. Given this multiplicity of referents, it is not surprising that there is debate and confusion about the nature of emotions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
In this article, we argue that restriction of the use of the term 'emotion' to subjective experiences, and use of other terminology to describe objective responses that are often correlated with emotional experiences would eliminate much of the conceptual confusion. In making this case, we discuss several different conceptual approaches to subjective emotional experiences and the brain circuits proposed to underlie such experiences in these approaches. Because the emotion fear has been studied more than other emotions, especially in relation to brain circuits, and has been the center of much of the controversy about the nature of subjectively experienced emotion, we focus on it in our discussion. Because the argument made in this article applies to both fear and anxiety, we will not distinguish these two terms (for a discussion of the difference see [6] ).
Measuring subjective experiences
Before considering different approaches to subjective experiences, it is important to discuss how these unobservable private events are studied. Scientific assessments of inner experiences require some form of self-reporting [12, 13] . People can typically give either a verbal or a nonverbal report of information to which they have introspective access, but cannot provide a verbal report of information that is only processed nonconsciously [6, 14, 15] . Fractures between conscious and nonconscious processes by differences between verbal and non-verbal responses have thus played a key role in studies of introspective awareness in humans. While other methods of reporting that do not require verbal report have been proposed [16] [17] [18] , these also depend on introspection [15] .
Verbal self-report remains the gold standard in studies of consciousness. It is most suitable for assessing the content of immediate experiences rather than remembered experiences [14, 19] and is less useful for assessing the motivations underlying actions since these are often not consciously available and verbalizable [20, 21] . Since non-verbal reporting is the only option in non-verbal (non-human) organisms, determining whether other animals have conscious, subjective experiences is difficult [6] .
